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In recent weeks we could hear and read hundreds of
comments on the historical significance of the
enlargement of the European Union by ten new,
mostly former communist countries of Central and
East Europe. We could hear many words, but I fear
hardly any serious, well founded analyses. It was the
a priori position of almost all speakers that it was a
clearly positive and productive change for all con-
cerned.Any indication to think about this statement,
any indication of criticism, question mark or com-
ments regarding the costs involved in enlargement
were considered short-sighted or ill-intentioned.
Appearing here today, and I must emphasise that it is
not a political declaration of the president of one of
the new Member States, but the academic appearance
of a president in an academic environment, I can nei-
ther present an in-depth scientific analysis of the
effects of this year’s EU enlargement nor an empirical
analysis. This remains a long-term task for other peo-
ple, even though it will not be an easy task for them
either for lack of a simple scientific methodology and
tested instruments.Today,I would like to make at least
an effort at an elementary structuring of the problem,
based on the difference of the effects of enlargement
on the new Member States,on the old Member States,
and on the EU as a whole, as an institution.
Effects of formal membership on the new Member
States
At the moment of accession – whether accession
with many exceptions and restrictions (that are of
advantage to the existing members) – the new
Member States gain certain, for them very impor-
tant, political recognition, For them it is a formal
confirmation of the level of their present political,
economic and general civil maturity achieved,a con-
firmation of their present state of development and
their stability. Through EU membership they are
again counted among the normal European coun-
tries after half a century of abnormality, after half a
century under communism. This recognition is very
important for these countries and their citizens.That
is also the major benefit derived from EU member-
ship, although not everyone knows that there is such
a benefit that is rather symbolic and without con-
crete effects. These countries have striven for this
recognition for fifteen years. In a certain sense their
EU membership is for them – and for the entire rest
of the world – a signal that the era of post-commu-
nist transformation has definitely come to an end
and that they are countries that are institutionally
comparable with the other countries of Western
Europe, i.e. with countries that had the fortune of
not being objects of the communist experiment.
I don’t see any other indirect (or direct) effects.
There is frequently mention of the effect of the
opening, of the effect of the liberalisation of the
movement of people, goods, capital and ideas.
However, the extent of the opening of these coun-
tries vis-à-vis the EU countries and vice versa, the
opening of the EU countries vis-à-vis these coun-
tries, did not change on May 1st, 2004. Effects de-
rived from the mutual intensive relationships, have
already grown stepwise since the fall of the Berlin
Wall,since the barbed wires of the Iron Curtain were
cut in November 1989, and these effects had already
been “consumed” a long time before May 1st, 2004.
The residual effect of formal membership will be rel-
atively small from the point of view of these coun-
tries and their individual subjects.
Equally marginal will be the direct financial effect,
especially for the more developed countries among
the new members. Everything points to the fact that
the Czech Republic will become a net payer, but not
a net recipient of EU funds in the near future, which
is quite different from the state of EU accession of
such countries like Greece, Ireland, Spain or
Portugal.That is why it is incorrect to mention these
countries as examples. Many citizens of the new
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ences of these, at the time less developed, countries
and expect the same. But this will not happen.
I also do not see an important effect in the fact that
the new Member States will obtain the possibility of
influencing decision processes within the EU. They
are ill prepared for this (and will remain in the role
of “junior members” for a long time), they are small
countries and their effective participation in deci-
sions is in fact made impossible by the big brake
exerted by the democratic deficit of the EU and the
present extent of bureaucracy in the EU.
The new Member States already accepted EU legisla-
tion, the so-called Acquis Communitaire, during the
time before EU accession and thereby also accepted
the European (and originally German) model of a cor-
poratist state, the model of a social market economy
that is unambiguously connected with the low com-
petitiveness of the firms, with the rigidity of the entire
economy, with high unemployment and low economic
growth.This will not lead these countries, whose level
of development is lower than the European average,
to real economic convergence. There is even the risk
that, quite to the contrary, nominal convergence (the
assumption of the EU legislative) will become the
brake on real convergence. It should not be necessary
to stress this in a country that experienced unification,
in which the effects of unification (or rapid nominal
convergence) are well known.It is necessary,however,
to say that,in this sense,May 1st,2004 did not usher in
fundamental change, as EU legislation had already
been accepted by the countries several years ago, or
that, respectively, their acceptance was a prerequisite,
not a consequence of accession.
This sketch of positive, neutral or negative effects is
certainly neither complete nor sufficiently founded
empirically, but it is my opinion that it may present
an inspiration and guide for deeper analyses. I must
emphasise that they are based on the experience of
an active participant in the era before accession.It is
by no means the view of an independent observer.
Effects of EU enlargement on the old Member
States
Even if the effects of the asymmetric liberalisation
and of the guileless opening of the new Member
States vis-à-vis the more developed, older Member
States was unambiguously of advantage for the old
Member States before accession, I must state clearly
that formal membership of the new states does not
imply a true advantage for the old Member States.
Even if during the entire era before enlargement,the
benefits derived from the contacts with these coun-
tries exceeded the costs of the old Member States
spent on them, after formal membership of the new
states, the cost-benefit ratio will worsen.
The old Member States know this and therefore they
were in no hurry to agree to EU enlargement. I can-
not blame them for this position,as I respect authen-
tic human interests.It is not surprising either that the
Brussels bureaucracy pushed enlargement much
more than the old Member States (a bureaucracy is
always interested in increasing its scope of action). I
repeat, from the point of view of the old Member
States I consider this rational and therefore there is
no reason to deny it. In view of the unwarranted but
often repeated identification of the EU with Europe,
the old member countries could no longer maintain
the exclusive nature of the EU club. That is why
enlargement happened – without consideration of
the actual interests of these countries.
Analytically it is very difficult to separate the effects
of the very close relationships of the old and the new
Member States, which existed for more than a
decade, from the new effects that will come into
being following enlargement. Competition for EU
funds will certainly intensify. There will also be an
increase – though less than expected – of the migra-
tion of workers (and also students) to the richer
countries, only few more cautious west Europeans
“dare” go to the new Member States, coming as
tourists, as businessmen, as investors for the first
time. I am sure that cultural exchange will increase,
but these phenomena are difficult to quantify.That is
why I don’t dare a quantitative estimate of these
effects.But there should also be no cheap propagan-
da in the other direction.
In summary, I can say that the direct effect of this
year’s enlargement on the old Member States will
not be large and only difficult to quantify.
Effects of EU enlargement on the EU
The increase in the number of members from 15 to
25 implies an enlargement of the EU as an institu-
tion. By stressing the word institution, I want to
express that this is not just a significant increase in
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the size of the single market, as this already hap-
pened a long time before the moment of the formal
enlargement.At the same time it is also true that the
low mobility of labour, the rigidity of business rela-
tions and the administrative complications so typical
for the EU did not end or change on May 1st, 2004.
Therefore the quality of the single market did not
change either.
The strength of the EU does also not change signifi-
cantly, but this year’s enlargement causes an increase
in the illusions of those who have a block view, a con-
tinental view of the world,that is of those who assume
that a Europe that is larger and more compact will
have a bigger chance of standing up to the hegemony
of the United States and the big ambitions of Asia.
This block view of the world,which emerged so clear-
ly in the draft of the EU constitution, is a fatal error.
Europe is only a conglomeration of countries (and
will hopefully remain so) and there is by no means an
authentic European “people”. There is also no proof
that “big is beautiful”. The so-called competitiveness
of Europe is also nothing but a statistical artefact, as
only firms can be competitive.There is no such thing
as the competitiveness of a continent. A continent
(not even the EU) is not an economic subject, it does
not produce, trade, innovate, invest, save, rationalise
production or lower costs. This way of looking at
things,so widespread in politics and the media,stands
in sharp contrast not only to the political, economic
and demographic realities of present Europe,but also
to the dominant globalisation trends.
EU enlargement to 25 members does significantly
affect the decision processes in the EU.There will be
an increase in transaction costs for the functioning of
this institution,as ten countries are added to the exist-
ing mechanism without any change therein (corre-
sponding to a 40 percent increase). This is a well
known price of enlargement, but its size cannot be
easily quantified.That is why it is rarely understood or
seriously discussed. The volume of policies, of activi-
ties and interventions in the EU does not decline
(acceptance of the constitution in its present form
would rather increase it radically) and that has the
consequence of non-zero costs, given the increase in
the number of participating subjects. This is true of
any centralised and hierarchically organised system.It
is a law that cannot be entirely circumvented.
There is, however, a method to lower these transac-
tion costs (or to slow their increase).It consists of an
increase of the democratic deficit in decision-mak-
ing, a reduction of the extent of democratic proce-
dures, an increase of the role of the inner core of the
Union, an increase in the number of areas in which
majority voting within the EU is allowed. Without
any doubt, it also includes an increase in the
anonymity of decisions, a further increase in the dis-
tance of the citizens from the EU centre, a further
depersonalisation of the EU. In any case, these are
the negative effects of the last EU enlargement.
Unfortunately they cannot be changed by well inten-
tioned politicians and civil servants.
In order to be understood correctly I am repeating
the argument. There are three variables – the num-
ber of member countries, the volume of EU policies
and the mechanism of decision-making. These are
not and cannot be compatible, only a trade-off. The
increase in one variable (number of member coun-
tries), given an unchanged second variable (EU
activities), necessarily has effects on the third vari-
able (decision-making mechanism).I must insist that
expressing this trivial conclusion is not euro-scepti-
cism but logical thinking.And to do so is our duty.
With this I am drawing to a close. Formal EU
enlargement is no radical change. But it can be the
starting point for a strengthening of the processes
that occurred in varying intensity during the past
decade.Some of these were positive,some were neg-
ative. That will continue. The principal problem lies
somewhere else.It lies in the necessary change of the
basic model of the European social order.A year ago
Europe was divided into new and old. I do not con-
sider this a useful and fair division. But we ought to
make use of the term “New Europe”. This term
should be given a different meaning – the meaning
of a Europe of economic freedom, a Europe of a
small and not expanding state, a Europe without
state paternalism,a Europe without pseudo-moralis-
ing political correctness, a Europe without intellec-
tual snobbism and elitism, a Europe without super-
national,continental ambitions,a Europe without an
ideology of Europeanism. If somebody were to call
(or characterise) such a Europe on the other side of
the ocean the “New Europe”,that would be so much
for the better. Unfortunately I must stress that the
last EU enlargement by ten states does not and will
not have such an implication.
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